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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Petitioner/Appellant has appealed to this Court from a final order entered by 
the Utah Labor Commission Appeals Board ("Board"). This Court has jurisdiction to 
hear and decide this appeal pursuant to §§ 78-2a-3(2)(a), 34A-l-303(6), and 63-46b-16, 
Utah Code Annot. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the Board acted within its statutory discretion in substituting its findings 
and conclusions for those of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Utah appellate courts have applied an 
intermediate level of scrutiny to agency determinations when the Legislature has given 
the agency a grant of discretion in the governing statute. See Morton International Inc. 
v. Auditing Division. 814 P.2d 581, 587-88 (Utah 1991); Osman Home Improvement v. 
Industrial Commission, 958 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). In Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-1-301, the Legislature granted the Labor Commission the "duty and full power, 
jurisdiction, and authority to determine the facts and apply the law in [the applicable] 
chapter or any other title or chapter it administers." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-301. 
Furthermore, the Legislature granted the Board the authority to "reverse the findings, 
conclusions, and decision of an administrative law judge." Utah Code Ann, § 34A-1-
303(4)(a)(iv). Given that the Legislature granted the Board the authority to accept, 
modify, or reverse the ALJ's findings and adopt its own, an appellate court will not 
disturb the agency's determinations unless it exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and 
rationality. See Capo roz v. Labor Commission, 945 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997)("[a]gency discretion may be either express or implied and, if granted, results in 
review of the agency action for an abuse of discretion"); Niederhauser Ornamental & 
Metal Works Co. v. Tax Commission, 858 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
The issue was preserved in the record at R. 950-957. 
2. Whether substantial evidence supported the Board's finding that there was no 
causal connection between the protected activity and the subsequent adverse action. 
Standard of Review: The determination of whether a causal connection exists 
between the protected activity and the subsequent adverse action is an issue of fact. See 
Viktron/Lika v. Labor Commission, 38 P.3d 993, 995 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). This Court 
"grants great deference to an agency's findings, and will uphold them if they are 
'supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the 
court.'" Department of the Air Force v. Swiden 824 P.2d 448, 451 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
quoting Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g). "Substantial evidence is such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Grace 
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Moreover, this 
Court will not substitute its judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views even 
if it may come to a different conclusion had the case been presented to it for de novo 
review. Id. at 68. "It is the province of the [Commission], not appellate courts, to resolve 
conflicting evidence, and where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same 
evidence, it is for the [Commission] to draw the inferences." Id. 
Finally, if the Petitioner wished to challenge the factual findings, she had the duty 
to properly present the record by marshaling "'all of the evidence supporting the findings 
and show that despite the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory 
evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence.'" Viktron/Lika, 38 P.3d 
at 995; quoting Grace Drilling Co., 776 P.2d at 68; see also Beaver County v. Utah State 
Tax Commission, 916 P.2d 344, 355-56 (Utah 1996); Department of the Air Force v. 
Sw|der, 824 P.2d 448, 451 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9)(providing that 
"[a] party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports 
the challenged finding."). 
This issue was preserved in the record at R. 930-938; 950-957. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code § 34A-1-301 provides as follows: 
The commission has the duty and the full power, jurisdiction, 
and authority to determine the facts and apply the law in this 
chapter or any other title or chapter it administers. 
Utah Code § 34A-l-303(2)(c)(ii) provides as follows: 
(ii) A decision of the Appeals Board is a final order of the commission 
unless set aside by the court of appeals. 
Utah Code § 34A-l-303(4) provides as follows: 
(a) On Appeal, the commissioner or the Appeals Board may: 
(i) affirm the decision of an administrative law judge; 
(ii) modify the decision of an administrative law judge; 
(iii) return the case to an administrative law judge for further action as 
directed; or 
(iv) reverse the findings, conclusions, and decision of an administrative 
law judge. 
Utah Code § 34A-l-303(4)(c)(i) and (ii) provides as follows: 
The commissioner or Appeals Board may base its decision on: 
(i) the evidence previously submitted in the case; or 
(ii) on written argument or written supplemental evidence requested by 
the commissioner or Appeals Board. 
Utah Code § 63-46b-16(4)(g) provides as follows: 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the 
agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review 
has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Susan Carter ("Carter") was employed by Henry Schein, Inc. ("Henry Schein") on 
March 12, 1997 as a commissioned sales representative. She subsequently became an 
employee of Sullivan-Schein Dental Company ("Sullivan-Schein") on November 14, 
1997 following a merger between Henry Schein and Sullivan Dental. Carter was 
involuntarily terminated on March 25, 1998 after two co-workers complained on separate 
occasions that she had violated a Sullivan-Schein company directive that prohibited a 
sales representative from soliciting ("poaching") an account not assigned to them. 
On August 11, 1998, Carter filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Labor 
Commission of the Utah Anti Discrimination Division alleging that her March 25, 1998 
termination violated the Utah Antidiscrimination Act of 1965 ("Act"), Utah Code § 34A-
5-101, et seq. (R. 1). Specifically, Carter alleged in her Charge that her March 25, 1998 
termination was in retaliation for a letter that she had submitted to Sullivan-Schein's 
management over three months earlier, claiming for the first time that several years 
earlier she had been a victim of alleged gender-based discrimination and inappropriate 
sexual comments involving two co-workers at her former employer, Mountain West 
Dental. Those former co-workers were now current Sullivan-Schein employees. Id; see 
also Hearing Exhibit P-2. 
An evidentiary hearing was conducted before an ALJ of the Utah Labor 
Commission on March 26, 27, 28 and June 10, 2003. In a decision issued on January 7, 
2004, the ALJ was persuaded that Sullivan-Schein had terminated Carter's employment 
in retaliation for her December 14, 1997 letter concerning a previous employer. (R. 769-
795). The ALJ concluded that Sullivan-Schein's action violated the Act's prohibition 
against retaliation, and awarded Carter damages of $191,649.72, plus interest. Id, 
On March 8, 2004, Sullivan-Schein filed a timely Motion for Review requesting 
that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission ("Board") review the ALJ's 
decision. (R. 837-893). On May 31, 2005, the Board, in a 2-1 decision, concluded that 
Sullivan-Schein had not retaliated against Carter and, therefore, had not violated the Act. 
(R. 930-938). Accordingly, the Board set aside the ALJ's decision and dismissed 
Carter's complaint. 
On June 20, 2005, Carter filed with the Board a timely Motion to Reconsider the 
Board's May 31, 2005 order. (R. 938-948). On August 25, 2005 the Board denied 
Carter's Motion to Reconsider, thereby re-affirming its previous decision entered on May 
31, 2005. (R. 970-973). On September 13, 2005, Carter filed a timely Petition for 
Review, pursuant to Utah Code §§ 63-46b-16 and 78-2a-3(2)(a), seeking from this Court 
a reversal of the Board's May 31, 2005 and August 25, 2005 decisions. (R. 974-975). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Carter's Employment with Mountain West Dental 
Between November 1992 and August 1993, Susan Carter ("Carter"), was 
employed by Mountain West Dental as a field sales representative where she was 
supervised by Blaine Brown ("Brown") and Parke Simmons ("Simmons"). Carter's 3/26 
Hearing Transcript ("HT") @ 71, 173; Appellant's Appendix ("App.") 71, 97. In August 
1993, Mountain West Dental terminated Carter's employment. Carter's 3/26 HT @ 71-
72, 79, 173; App. 71, 73, 97. Carter never formally complained about the conditions of 
her employment or about her termination from Mountain West Dental. 
B. Sullivan Dental Acquires Mountain West Dental 
Three years after Carter was terminated by Mountain West Dental, in September 
1996, Sullivan Dental Products, Inc. ("Sullivan Dental"), a large multi-state dental 
equipment and supply distributor, acquired Mountain West Dental. Simmons' 3/27 HT 
@ 191; Nightingale's 6/10 HT @ 225-26; App. 173, 325. Following Sullivan Dental's 
acquisition of Mountain West Dental, Brown and Simmons became employees of 
Sullivan Dental. Simmons' 3/27 HT @ 190-191; App. 173. 
C. Carter Goes to Work at Henry Schein, Inc., Which Acquires Sullivan Dental 
In March 1997, Carter became employed by Henry Schein, Inc. ("Henry Schein"), 
a multi-state direct mail order dental supply company, as a commissioned sales 
representative in the Salt Lake City area. Carter's 3/27 HT @ 26; Engel's 3/28 HT @ 
105; Scheutzow's 6/10 HT @ 116; App. 132, 229, 297. On or about November 12, 1997 
Henry Schein and Sullivan Dental announced to the public that the two companies were 
merging. Engel's 3/28 HT @ 95-96; App. 226. This merger resulted in two direct 
competitors combining their operations and creating a single sales force; respective sales 
forces that were accustomed to competing with each other. Engel's 3/28 HT @ 98-99, 
103; Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 216; App. 227-228, 256. This meant that Carter, Brown 
and Simmons would once again be working for the same company, as Sullivan-Schein 
employees. Carter's 3/26 HT @ 81-83, 86; App. 74-75. 
D. Carter's December 14, 1997 Letter 
Carter, apparently concerned about working again with Brown and Simmons, even 
though neither individual would have any supervisory control over her at Sullivan-
Schein, drafted and faxed a letter to Henry Schein's management on December 14, 1997. 
Carter's 3/26 HT @ 84-86, 169, 175-176; Bingham's 3/27 HT @ 267; Hearing Exhibit P-
2; App. 74-75, 96-97, 190. Carter claimed she drafted the December 14, 1997 letter in 
order to protect her job. Carter's 3/26 HT @ 84-85, 169-172; App. 74-75, 96. In her 
letter, Carter expressed her concern based upon her experience at Mountain West Dental 
that she would be uncomfortable working again in the same office with Brown and 
Simmons, and requested a separate office location. Carter's 3/26 HT @ 170; Hearing 
Exhibit P-2; App. 96. On or about December 29, 1997 Henry Schein's management 
through its Vice President - Human Resources and Special Counsel, Leonard David 
("David"), formally responded to Carter's December 14, 1997 letter (Hearing Exhibit R-
3). David's 6/10 HT @ 163, 171-173; Hearing Exhibit R-3; App. 309, 311-312. Carter 
received David's letter. Carter's 3/26 HT @ 177-178; App. 98. David's December 29, 
1997 letter invited Carter to contact him if she had any complaints or concerns regarding 
any type of harassment or retaliation. David's 6/10 HT @ 173; Carter's 3/26 HT @ 179; 
Hearing Exhibit R-3; App. 312, 98. Carter never subsequently contacted David with any 
complaints or concerns of any type of harassment or retaliation. David's 6/10 HT @ 
173-174; Carter's 3/26 HT @ 179-180, App. 312, 98. Also in response to Carter's letter, 
Sullivan-Schein executives counseled Brown and Simmons against any inappropriate 
conduct, comments, or retaliation against Carter. David's 6/10 HT @ 172-173; 
Simmons' 3/27 HT @ 193-197; App. 311-312, 174-175. 
E. Dynamics of the Merger Between Henry Schein and Sullivan Dental 
The merger between Henry Schein and Sullivan Dental was unavoidably a delicate 
and fragile business arrangement, given the competitive landscape of merging and 
integrating two formerly competitive sales forces into one sales force in the same market, 
with the same customer base. Engel's 3/28 HT @ 98-105, 114-116, 121, 141-142; 
Scheutzow's 6/10 HT @ 127-128; App. 227-229, 231, 233, 238, 300. In many instances, 
the sales representatives from the two merged companies had previously been competing 
with each other by calling on the same customers. Engel's 3/28 HT @ 102-103, 105; 
Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 216; App. 228-229, 256. 
In Utah, the merger meant that more sales representatives would have to split the 
same amount of sales territory. Carter's 3/26 HT @ 171; App. 96. The merger also 
created an overlap of customers between the sales representatives, as many sales 
representatives from the merged companies had the assignment of the same sales 
accounts, or what were referred to as "crossover accounts." Engel's 3/28 HT @ 118-119; 
Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 221-223; App. 232, 258. The term "crossover" simply refers to 
the situation when two sales representatives are assigned to the same sales account. 
Scheutzow's 6/10 HT @ 115-116; Engel's 3/28 HT @ 106; Butler's 3/26 HT @ 225-226; 
App. 297, 229, 110. 
The dynamics of the merger created many challenges for the newly merged 
company as the merger bred distrust between the former Sullivan Dental and former 
Henry Schein sales representatives; sales representatives that once were fierce 
competitors with each other. Engel's 3/28 HT @ 98-106, 115-116; App. 227-229, 231, 
234-235. At the same time, other companies competing with Sullivan-Schein were trying 
to steal sales representatives whenever possible and discredit the new company. Engel's 
3/28 HT @ 105-106, 141-142; App. 229, 238. 
To navigate the changes resulting from the merger and in order to ensure its 
success, Sullivan-Schein instituted a policy prohibiting sales representatives from calling 
on accounts not assigned to them. Engel's 3/28 HT @ 120-121; Carter's 3/26 HT @ 169; 
App. 232-233, 96. This policy was intended to prevent intra-company competition 
between sales representatives for the same business, as the success of the merger was, in 
part, dependent on a smooth integration of the two merged sales forces. Engel's 3/28 HT 
@ 115, 120-121, 141-142; Scheutzow's 6/10 HT @ 127-128; App. 231, 232-233, 238, 
300. 
F. The Roadshow Directive to Play Like a Team 
Shortly after the merger the new merged company conducted several "roadshows" 
to introduce the merged sales force to the new company. Engel's 3/28 HT @ 112-115; 
App. 230-231. Carter attended the Seattle, Washington roadshow held on January 5, 
1998. Engel's 3/28 HT @ 112-115; Carter's 3/26 HT @ 178-179; App. 230-231, 98. 
James Stahly ("Stahly"), Sullivan-Schein's President of the North American Dental 
Group and James Engel ("Engel"), Sullivan-Schein's zone manager for the western zone, 
also attended the January 5, 1998 roadshow and were the roadshow's primary presenters. 
Engel's 3/28 HT @ 112-113; App. 231-231. Engle made his presentation dressed in a 
referee's uniform. Engel's 3/28 HT @ 115; App. 231. 
One of the messages stressed at the Seattle roadshow was that all sales 
representatives had to play like a team in order to make the merger a success. Engel's 
3/28 HT @ 114-116, 120-121; App. 231-233. This message was designed to squelch any 
intra-company competition between sales representatives following the merger as 
Sullivan-Schein specifically stressed to all its sales representatives that they should not 
call on customers no longer assigned to them. Id. Stahly informed all Seattle roadshow 
attendees that the new merged company would have zero tolerance for anyone who 
violated this rule. Engel's 3/28 HT @ 120-122, 167-168; Scheutzow's 6/10 HT @ 125-
127; App. 232-233, 244, 300. Stahly also informed the roadshow attendees that if they 
competed with their own team members by calling on accounts not assigned to them, 
such conduct would subject them to termination. Engel's 3/28 HT @ 159-160, 167-168; 
Scheutzow's 6/10 @ 125-127; App. 242, 244, 300. 
G. Competition, Crossovers and Assignment of Sales Accounts 
The crossover issues created by the merger generated a competitive environment 
between sales representatives. Engel's 3/28 HT @ 103-105, 115; Bingham's 3/27 HT @ 
264; Butler's 3/26 HT @ 226-229; Carter's 3/26 HT @ 169-172; App. 228-229, 231, 
189, 110-111, 96. This competitive environment was fueled by sales representatives 
trying to maintain those sales accounts they had prior to the merger. Engel's 3/28 HT @ 
115; Bingham's 3/27 HT @ 264; Carter's 3/26 HT @ 171-172; App. 231, 189, 96. 
Carter understood the rule that Sullivan-Schein sales representatives were prohibited 
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from calling on another sales representative's sales account. Carter's 3/26 HT @ 169, 
172;App.96. 
In relationship to the merger, Sullivan-Schein devised a plan to eliminate 
crossovers and to balance the territories between sales representatives so that each 
particular sales account was assigned to only a single Sullivan-Schein sales 
representative. Engel's 3/28 HT @ 106-111, Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 221-223; App. 
229-230, 258. When two sales representatives had assignment of the same account, the 
sales representative with the highest dollar sales volume was usually assigned that 
account. Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 222-223; App. 258. However, if a customer expressed 
a preference for one sales representative over another sales representative, the preferred 
sales representative was assigned the account regardless of sales volume. Scheutzow's 
3/28 HT @ 223; Engel's 3/28 HT @ 109-110; App. 258, 230. Eliminating all of the 
crossover issues was not necessarily an easy or a quick task. Engel's 3/28 HT @ 101-
104, 107-111; Bingham's 3/27 HT@ 258; App. 228-230, 188. 
In order to prevent sales representatives from either interfering with the process to 
eliminate crossovers or from unduly influencing the process, sales representatives were 
given two specific instructions to follow until a final list of accounts could be completed. 
Scheutzow's 6/10 HT @ 127-128; App. 300. First, sales representatives were instructed 
to conduct business as usual by continuing to call on their accounts, including crossover 
accounts. Scheutzow's 6/10 HT @ 36; Bingham's 3/27 HT @ 259; App. 277, 188. 
Second, to prevent a sales representative from unduly influencing an account's preference 
during the process of eliminating crossovers, sales representatives were instructed that 
they should not solicit a customer to express a preference in their favor. Scheutzow's 
6/10 HT @ 37, 127-128; Bingham's 3/27 HT @ 259-262; App. 278, 300, 188-189. This 
was known as "soliciting loyalty." Id. 
However, after an account was assigned to a specific sales representative, 
Sullivan-Schein provided very clear directives to its sales representatives that they should 
not call on an account no longer assigned to them. EngePs 3/28 HT @ 119-122; 
Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 223-225; Carter's 3/26 HT @ 169; App. 232-233, 258-259, 96. 
In fact, all sales representatives recognize an unwritten industry taboo against calling on 
an account assigned exclusively to another or fellow sales representative. Engel's 3/28 
HT @ 121-122; Bingham's 3/27 HT @ 261-264; Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 223-224; App. 
233, 189, 258. Carter, herself, clearly understood this rule. Carter's 3/26 HT @ 169; 
App. 96. Gary Anderson ("Anderson"), Henry Schein's Director of Human Resources, 
described this industry taboo as "poaching." Anderson's 3/28 HT @ 64-65; App. 218-
219. Anderson defined "poaching" as occurring when a salesperson attempts to usurp an 
account that's on somebody else's account list. Anderson's 3/28 HT @ 65; App. 219. 
Sullivan-Schein had and has a strong, virtual no-tolerance policy against a salesperson 
who attempts to "poach" an account from a fellow sales representative. Anderson's 3/28 
HT @ 65; Engel's 3/28 HT @ 120-122; App. 219, 232-233. 
H. Carter's Repetitive Predatory Behavior Leads to Her Termination 
Carter was the subject of three separate complaints from co-workers involving 
predatory behavior; one resulting in no discipline, the second in a written warning, and 
the third resulting in her termination. None of the co-workers that complained about 
Carter's predatory conduct had knowledge of her December 14, 1997 letter. Bingham's 
3/27 HT @ 289; Butler's 3/26 HT @ 276-277; App. 196, 122-123. All three complaints 
by Carter's co-workers were directed to her direct supervisor, Joseph Scheutzow 
("Scheutzow"). Butler's 3/26 HT @ 241-242, 255-257; Bingham's 3/27 HT @ 271-272; 
Scheutzow's 3/28 @ 227-228, 232-234; Scheutzow's 6/10 HT @ 90; App. 114, 117-118, 
191, 259-261. The three complaints against Carter each echoed the same type of 
predatory behavior; behavior that Sullivan-Schein had previously warned all sales 
representatives, including Carter, to avoid.. Carter's 3/26 HT @ 169; Engel's 3/28 HT @ 
115-122; App. 96, 231-233. 
The first complaint was lodged by Mike Butler ("Butler"). Specifically, Butler 
complained to Scheutzow that Carter had gone into his best customer, Dr. Brooks, 
claiming that she, rather then Butler, was the Sullivan-Schein sales representative. 
Butler's 3/26 HT @ 225, 241-243; Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 232; App. 110, 114, 260. As 
a result of Carter's predatory conduct, Butler lost the account. Butler's 3/26 HT @ 225, 
241-242, 274; App. 110, 114, 122. Although the Dr. Brooks' account may have been on 
Carter's "run list" at the time she attempted to solicit the account, making the account a 
"crossover" account, the Dr. Brooks' account was one of Butler's best customers. 
Carter's attempt to go into that account, claiming that she suddenly was the Sullivan-
Schein sales representative to the exclusion of Butler, was viewed by Butler as not 
playing by the rules. Butler's 3/26 HT @ 225-229, 241-242, 274; Scheutzow's 3/28 HT 
@ 232-234; Scheutzow's 6/10 HT @ 67; App. 110-111, 114, 122, 260-261. Carter's 
aggressive conduct illustrated and foreshadowed her predatory behavior towards her own 
sales team members that ultimately resulted in her termination; behavior that her sales 
team members greatly resented. Butler's 3/26 HT @ 273-274 (Butler: "I was very angry 
because I lost my best account."); Bingham's 3/27 HT @ 282 (Bingham: "I still felt it 
was out of bounds..."); App. 122, 194. It was Carter's conduct at the Dr. Brooks' 
account that led Butler to formally complain about her later conduct at Heritage Dental. 
That complaint ultimately led to Carter's termination. Butler's 3/26 HT @ 273-276; 
Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 233-234; App. 122, 261. 
The second complaint against Carter was made by Melanie Bingham 
("Bingham"). Bingham complained to Scheutzow that Carter had tried to solicit the Dr. 
Clegg account; an account that was specifically and without dispute assigned to 
Bingham. Carter's 3/26 HT @ 180-181; Bingham's 3/27 HT @ 270-273; App. 98-99, 
191-192. Carter knew the Dr. Clegg account was assigned exclusively to Bingham, 
although the Dr. Clegg account had been previously assigned to Carter as a Henry Schein 
representative. Carter's 3/26 HT @ 121-122, 180-184; App. 84, 98-99. Carter further 
understood that once the Dr. Clegg account was assigned to Bingham she (Carter) was no 
longer to engage in any activities to solicit that account. Carter's 3/26 HT @ 180-181, 
184; App. 98-99. 
After the Dr. Clegg account had been removed from Carter's accounts list and 
assigned exclusively to Bingham, Carter spoke with Dr. Clegg and a staff member 
regarding the manner in which Dr. Clegg's orders should be placed in order to obtain the 
lowest possible price. Carter's 3/26 HT @ 180-181, 184-189; App. 98-101. Carter 
explained to Dr. Clegg that Bingham was applying the wrong pricing plan to his account, 
is 
as Bingham needed to input his orders through the Schein computer system rather than 
through the Sullivan computer system; a tactic that clearly undermined Bingham's 
credibility with her own customer. Carter's 3/26 HT @ 185-189; Hearing Exhibit R-4; 
App. 100-101. Bingham considered Carter's conduct "out of bounds," especially in light 
of the tensions between sales representatives caused by the merger and the rules that team 
members were given to follow. Bingham's 3/27 HT @ 263-266, 273-274, 281-282; App. 
189-190,192,194. 
In response to Bingham's complaint, Engel sent a letter to Carter, dated February 
18, 1998, warning her of possible termination for any future episodes of attempting to 
secure customers assigned to other Sullivan-Schein sales representatives. Engel's 3/28 
HT @ 135-142; Hearing Exhibit R-4; Carter's 3/26 HT @ 189; App. 236-238, 101. 
Engel decided to discipline Carter and issue her the February 18, 1998 letter only after 
Bingham vehemently complained about Carter's predatory contact with her client, Dr. 
Clegg. Bingham's 3/27 HT @ 271-275; Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 227-230; Hearing 
Exhibit R-4; App. 191-192, 259-260. Engel also issued Carter the warning letter out of 
his concern that Carter's conduct threatened and undermined the success of the merger, 
as her conduct clearly violated the "play like a team" concept that Engel had previously 
communicated to all sales representatives at the roadshows. Engel's 3/28 HT @ 114-116 
(Engel: "...if we allowed anyone - to buck the system, so-to-speak, you know, the 
referees would be called in to throw a flag."), 141-142; Hearing Exhibit R-4; App. 231, 
238. 
The third complaint, like the first, also was made by Butler. Heritage Dental, at 
the request of the customer, had been re-assigned by Scheutzow to Butler. Butler's 3/26 
HT @ 249-257; Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 233-236; Scheutzow's 6/10 HT @ 134; App. 
116-118, 261, 302. After Butler was assigned the Heritage Dental account, he was 
informed by the customer that Carter had continued to come into the office and that if she 
came back, Heritage Dental's owner would call the police on her. Butler's 3/26 HT @ 
255-257; 272-274, Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 233-236; App. 117-118, 121-122, 261. 
Butler immediately reported Carter's intrusions into Heritage Dental to Scheutzow: 
"She's doing it again... She's calling on one of my accounts." Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 
233-234; App. 261. Scheutzow clearly understood Butler's reference that "She's doing it 
again" as a reference to Butler's previous complaint about Carter's solicitation of Dr. 
Brooks, one of Butler's best customers. Id. 
I. Carter's Termination 
It was Butler's complaint about Carter's intrusions into the Heritage Dental 
account that directly led to her termination. Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 233-242; App. 261-
263. Just prior to Butler's complaint about Carter's intrusion into the Heritage Dental 
account, Sullivan-Schein's management had decided to terminate two sales positions in 
Utah as part of a territory realignment necessitated by the merger. Scheutzow's 3/28 HT 
@ 246-252; App. 264-265. This territory realignment resulted in the termination of 
Michael Blickfeldt and Kent Evans; all other Utah sales representatives, including Carter, 
were considered to be final team members. Engle's 3/28 HT @ 131-132; Scheutzow's 
3/28 HT @ 246-252; Scheutzow's 6/10 HT @ 129; Hearing Exhibits R-33, R-34, R-36; 
App. 235, 264-265, 301. After learning of the final list of sales representatives following 
the realignment, Stahly specifically mentioned to Engel that he was pleased Carter would 
be part of the team. EngePs 3/28 HT @ 131-132; App. 235. There was no predisposition 
against Carter among management. 
Scheutzow, after confirming Butler's complaint about Carter going into Heritage 
Dental, contacted Engel. Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 236; App. 261. Scheutzow informed 
Engel that Carter had gone into one of Butler's accounts again, and the account owner 
had threatened to call the police if Carter came back. Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 236; 
Engel's 3/28 HT @ 143; App. 261, 238. After receiving the information regarding 
Butler's complaint, Engel contacted Stahly for advice as to what action should be taken 
against Carter. Engel's 3/28 HT @ 143; App. 238. Stahly, based upon the information 
that Carter again had encroached on another sales representative's account, and based 
upon the previous February 18, 1998 warning letter (Hearing Exhibit R-4/P-8) issued to 
Carter, gave Engel the instruction to terminate Carter's employment immediately. 
Engel's 3/28 HT @ 143-144; App. 238. 
Carter's poaching was tolerated once, but not twice. On March 25, 1998, 
Scheutzow informed Carter that she was being terminated from her employment 
specifically for calling on the Heritage Dental account that had been assigned to Butler, 
thus violating the February 18, 1998 directive from Engel that warned Carter to not 
solicit the loyalty of customers assigned to other sales representatives. Scheutzow's 3/28 
HT @ 237-243; Scheutzow's 6/10 HT @ 128-129, 134; Hearing Exhibit R-14; App. 262-
263, 300-302. Carter was disciplined and then terminated for poaching; not for 
"crossover" issues. Scheutzow's 6/10 HT @ 121, 128-129; Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 
234-236; Engel's 3/28 HT @ 201; App. 299-301, 253, 261. Carter was the only Sullivan-
Schein sales representative who violated this rule regarding calling on an account not 
assigned to her after having been previously warned not to engage in such conduct. 
Engel's 3/28 HT @ 142-143, 201-202; Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 230-231; App. 238, 253, 
260. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the Board because Carter failed to marshal the evidence 
supporting the Board's decision. In her opening brief Carter ignored evidence supporting 
the Board's findings and instead selectively marshaled only the isolated pieces of 
evidence that support her case. Simply, Carter failed to marshal the evidence to show 
that the Board's findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Even if Carter had 
met her burden in marshaling the evidence, she nevertheless failed to demonstrate any 
fatal flaw in the evidence, the gravity of which would be sufficient to convince this Court 
that the Board's findings are clearly erroneous. Without Carter demonstrating a fatal 
flaw in the evidence, this Court should not overturn the Board's findings even if another 
conclusion from the evidence is possible. 
The Board was well within its statutory authority when it reversed the findings and 
conclusions of the ALJ and adopted its own. Moreover, the Board made sufficient 
factual findings to demonstrate a logical and legal basis for its determination that the 
evidence did not warrant an inference of a causal connection between Carter's December 
14, 1997 letter and her March 25, 1998 termination. This Court should affirm also 
because the Board acted within its statutory discretion, and because its decision is 
supported by substantial evidence. The Utah legislature granted the Board express 
statutory authority to accept, modify, or reverse the ALJ's findings and adopt its own. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-l-303(4)(a)(iv). 
Finally, this Court should affirm the Board because it carefully and correctly 
applied the correct legal standard in making its finding that there was no causal 
connection between Carter's December 14, 1997 letter and her March 25, 1998 
termination. The Board properly relied upon Viktron/Lika v. Labor Commission, 38 P.3d 
999 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) as setting forth the elements of a prima facie case of unlawful 
retaliation. Carter did not show, and cannot show that the Board's findings are so lacking 
in support as to make them clearly erroneous. Substantial evidence strongly supports the 
Board's findings, and even if this Court were to believe that another conclusion from the 
evidence is possible, this Court is obligated to affirm the Board's decision. The Board 
correctly found that Sullivan-Schein terminated Carter because of her co-workers' 
complaints, and not in retaliation for her letter alleging years old discrimination at a 
different employer. (R. 934,971). 
ARGUMENT 
L CARTER FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE. 
This Court should affirm the Board for the reason that Carter wholly failed to 
marshal the evidence. In challenging the Board's factual findings, Carter was obligated 
to proceed in two steps. First, she had to marshal all the evidence supporting the Board's 
findings. Second, she was required to demonstrate that despite the supporting facts, and 
in light of any conflicting or contradictory evidence, the Board's findings are not 
supported by substantial evidence. See Viktron/Lika v. Labor Commission, 38 P.3d 993, 
995 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). She did neither. This Court has consistently affirmed an 
agency's factual findings so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. See 
Whitear v. Labor Commission, 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Substantial 
evidence is "'that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a 
reasonable mind to support a conclusion.'" U.S. West Communications, Inc. v. Public 
Service Commission, 882 P.2d 141, 146 (Utah 1994) quoting Boston First National Bank 
v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990). Substantial 
evidence supports the Board's decision. 
The marshaling process required Carter to "present, in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced... which supports the very 
findings that the appellant resists." West Vallev City v. Majestic Investment Co., 818 
P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). (emphasis original). "Once the appellants have 
established every pillar supporting their adversary's position, they then 'must ferret out a 
fatal flaw in the evidence' and show why those pillars fail to support the [agency's] 
findings." Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, 872 P.2d 1052, 1053 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) quoting West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 1314. Consequently, an 
appellant fails to meet her burden of marshaling when she ignores evidence supportive of 
the agency's findings and instead selectively marshals only that evidence which is 
supportive of her position. See Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander & Smith 
Assoc, 881 P.2d 929, 933 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Such a tactic is tantamount to rearguing 
the merits of her case; a tactic this Court has consistently rejected. See Campbell v. Box 
Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)("When a party fails to marshal the 
evidence supporting a challenged fact finding, we reject the challenge as 'nothing more 
than an attempt to reargue the case before [the appellate] court.'" quoting Promax 
Development Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); Oneida/SLIC 
872 P.2d at 1053; Commercial Union Assoc, v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993); see also Questar Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 850 P.2d 1175, 1178 
(Utah 1993)("[W]hen reviewing an agency's decision, [we do] not ... reweigh the 
evidence."). 
Although Carter inserted within her brief a section entitled "Marshalling of the 
Evidence" and sprinkled selective facts within her arguments, she wholly failed to 
marshal all the evidence supporting the Board's decision. Rather, she attacked portions 
of the Board's findings that she disagrees with, and ignored evidence supporting those 
findings. Consequently, Carter has done nothing more than reargue her case before this 
Court by focusing her arguments on the Board's interpretation of the evidence and on 
those selective facts that she believes support her case. Because Carter failed to satisfy 
her threshold duty on appeal to properly marshal the evidence, this Court should affirm 
and uphold the Board's findings of fact. See Marshall v. Marshall 915 P.2d 508, 516 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996)(Absent a marshaling of evidence, "[w]e will uphold [an agency's] 
findings of fact."). 
Finally, even assuming Carter properly marshaled all the evidence before this 
Court, she had another obligation, to demonstrate a fatal flaw in the evidence, the gravity 
of which was sufficient to convince the appellate court that the Board's findings are 
clearly erroneous. See West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 1315 ("After constructing this 
magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in 
the evidence."). Simply, Carter failed to elicit a fatal flaw in the Board's decision that 
requires reversal. It is not enough for Carter to have merely shown conflicting evidence, 
or that inconsistent inferences could be drawn from the same evidence, in order for this 
Court to overturn the Board's findings. See Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 
P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)("It is the province of the [Board], not appellate courts, 
to resolve conflicting evidence, and where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the 
same evidence, it is for the [Board] to draw the inferences."). Because Carter failed to 
demonstrate a fatal flaw in the Board's decision, this Court should affirm the Board. 
II. THE BOARD WAS WITHIN ITS STATUTORY AUTHORITY IN 
MAKING ITS OWN FINDINGS OF FACT AND CREDIBILITY 
DETERMINATIONS. 
A. The Board's Statutory Authority and This Court's Role on Review Are 
Clear. 
This Court should reject Carter's claims that the Board exceeded its statutory 
authority. The Utah Code expressly grants the Board the authority to accept, modify, or 
reverse the ALJ's findings and adopt its own. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-
303(4)(a)(iv). There is nothing in the Utah Code that limits the power of the Board itself 
in reviewing and adopting or reversing the findings of the ALJ, nor mandates or indicates 
that the Board is bound by the findings of the ALJ when the evidence is conflicting. See 
United States Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 607 P.2d 807, 810 (Utah 1980); see 
also Utah Code Ann. § 34A-l-303(4)(a)(i)-(iv). In addition, only the action of the Board 
is subject to review here, and not the decision of the ALJ. This Court has jurisdiction 
only over "final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of 
state agencies...". See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a); see also Utah Code Ann. § 34A-
l-303(2)(c)(ii)("A decision of the Appeals Board is a final order of the Commission 
unless set aside by the court of appeals."). 
The Utah Supreme Court long ago declared that the Board may, "in its review of 
the record made before the Administrative Law Judge,...make its own findings on the 
credibility of the evidence presented." United States Steel Corp., 607 P.2d at 811; see 
also Utah Code Ann. § 34A-l-303(4)(a)(ii) and (iv). Subsequently, the Utah appellate 
courts have consistently followed the rule that an ALJ's findings are not binding in later 
agency review proceedings. See e.g., Giles v. Industrial Commission, 692 P.2d 743, 745 
(Utah 1984); Chase v. Industrial Commission, 872 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); 
Commercial Carriers v. Industrial Commission, 888 P.2d 707, 710 (Utah Ct App. 1994); 
Virgin v. Board of Review, 803 P.2d 1284, 1287 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); USX Corp. v. 
Industrial Commission, 781 P.2d 883, 886 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
B. Carter's Reliance on Vali is Misplaced. 
Carter relies on Vali Convalescent and Care Inst, v. Div. of Health Care 
Financing, 797 P.2d 438 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) to argue that the Board must detail the 
reasons for reaching a different result from that of the ALJ. See Petitioner's Brief at p. 
41; citing Vali, 797 P.2d at 447. Carter argues that the Board committed reversible error 
when it rejected the ALJ's credibility assessment of certain witnesses without stating in 
detail the reasons for doing so. See Petitioner's Brief at p. 41. This Court has 
consistently rejected this argument in previous cases, and should do so here. See 
Commercial Carriers, 888 P.2d at 710 ("[Petitioner] argues that the Board cannot reverse 
the ALJ's findings of fact without stating specifically and in detail the reasons for doing 
so. We disagree."). 
Carter misapplies and misinterprets this Court's ruling in Vali. There is no 
specific requirement under Utah law that a reviewing agency rejecting an ALJ's findings 
of fact and conclusions of law has to provide some kind of specific, point-by-point 
reasons as to why it disagrees with the ALJ. See Petitioner's Brief at p. 40. Such a 
requirement would place the reviewing agency in the role of an advocate confronted 
against its own ALJ. All that is required under Utah law is that the reviewing agency, 
when rejecting an ALJ's findings and adopting its own, provide subsidiary findings in 
sufficient detail so as to demonstrate that there is a logical and legal basis for its ultimate 
conclusions. See Vali, 797 P.2d at 450; see also Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. Public 
Service Commission, 720 P.2d 1373,1378 (Utah 1986). That requirement is met here. 
1. Vali concerned unarticulated credibility assessments. 
The decision in Vali addressed the issue of whether one party had settled and 
compromised its claim to interest when it accepted a settlement of a disputed claim. 
After a formal hearing, the hearing officer adopted the parties' stipulated facts and 
concluded that the matter of interest had not been settled or compromised. Vali, 797 P.2d 
at 442. The executive director of the Utah Department of Health, upon reviewing the 
record and the findings and conclusions of the hearing officer, purported to sustain the 
hearing's officer's findings of fact but overruled his conclusions of law; finding that the 
parties had an enforceable executory contract of settlement which included the claim for 
interest. Vail 797 P.2d at 442. On review, this Court found that because the hearing 
officer's findings were apparently based on his credibility determinations of the 
witnesses, the executive director's reversal of the hearing officer's findings were 
troubling since the executive director had not explained the basis for her ultimate factual 
conclusions. See Vail 797 P.2d at 447, 450. That is, this Court found that it could not 
sustain the executive director's reversal of the hearing officer's decision without the 
executive director having made additional written findings other than those of ultimate 
fact; requiring the executive director to articulate such adequate factual findings as to 
demonstrate that there was a logical and legal basis for her ultimate decision. Vail 797 
P.2d at 448-49 citing Milne Truck Lines, Inc., 720 P.2d at 1378. Based upon this Court's 
holding that the executive director failed to provide sufficiently detailed findings to 
disclose the steps by which she reached her ultimate factual conclusions, the Vali Court 
remanded the matter back to the executive director (through the district court) for an 
opportunity for the executive director "to make more adequate findings in support of, and 
folly articulate her reasons for, the determination she made." Vali, 797 P.2d at 450. 
2. The Board's decision here contains detailed findings. 
Unlike Vali, the Board in this matter made ample factual findings supporting its 
decision. (R. 934-935, 970-971). Consistent with the directive in Vali, the Board 
provided factual findings to support its determination that there was no causal connection 
between Carter's December 14, 1997 letter and her March 25, 1998 termination. The 
Board, through five (5) separate paragraphs, articulated sufficient detailed facts as to why 
it determined that there could be no reasonable inference to support a finding that a 
causal connection existed between protected activity and the adverse employment action. 
(R. 934-935). Specifically, the Board made subsidiary factual findings in such detail as 
to demonstrate a logical and legal basis for its determinations. Id. Given the detail of the 
Board's factual findings, there is no question that the Board examined all of the evidence 
presented to the ALJ, as well as the ALJ's findings and conclusions, before arriving at 
new findings of its own. 
Thus, absent evidence that the new findings are not supported by substantial 
evidence, this Court should affirm the findings and conclusions of the Board. See United 
States Steel Corp., 607 P.2d at 810 ("... this Court cannot overturn the findings of fact 
made by the Commission if there is substantial evidence furnishing a reasonable basis for 
such findings, there is nothing in our statutes which limits the power of the Commission 
itself in reviewing and adopting or reversing the findings of its [ALJ]."). 
III. THE BOARD'S FINDINGS ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE. 
A. The Board Correctly Applied the Proper Legal Analysis in 
Determining Carter's Retaliation Claim. 
The Board carefully and correctly applied the proper legal standard to the record, 
finding that there was no causal connection between Carter's December 14, 1997 letter 
and her subsequent termination. Carter attacked the Board's correct finding of no causal 
connection by asserting that by considering two items of evidence, the Board 
misunderstood and misapplied the elements of a retaliation claim under the Utah Anti-
Discrimination Act ("Act"). First, Carter asserts that the Board committed error by 
considering Sullivan-Schein's prompt and appropriate response to Carter's December 14, 
1997 letter. See Appellant's Brief at p. 35. Second, Carter asserts that the Board 
committed error by considering the fact that Carter's letter dealt with years old events 
involving an entirely different employer. Id. at p. 37. Contrary to Carter's claims, 
considering these factors was entirely proper, and the Board correctly applied the record 
herein to the elements of a retaliation claim under the Act. 
The Board correctly cited Viktron/Lika v. Labor Commission, 38 P.3d 993 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2001) as setting forth the elements ofa prima facie case of unlawful retaliation. 
(R. 933-934, 971). The Board properly identified the elements of a prima facie case of 
unlawful retaliation as consisting of: (1) protected opposition to discrimination; (2) 
adverse action by the employer subsequent to the protected activity; and (3) a causal 
connection between the employee's activity and the adverse action. (R. 933-934). 
Properly identifying the elements of a prima facie case for retaliation, the Board then 
correctly applied the evidence and found no inference of a causal connection between's 
Carter's December 14, 1997 letter and her termination over three months later. (R. 933-
935). 
1. Sullivan-Schein's Prompt Response was Properly Considered. 
In analyzing the third prong of the prima facie case, that is, whether there is a 
causal connection between the alleged protected activity and the adverse action, the 
Board properly considered the undisputed evidence that Sullivan-Schein, in order to 
prevent any future problems, took prompt and appropriate action in response to Carter's 
letter. (R. 934). Carter provided no legal authority suggesting that the Board erred in 
considering this evidence, or that the evidence was not relevant in evaluating whether 
there was a causal connection between the letter and the termination. Carter's only 
argument was that the Board conflated the elements of a retaliation claim and the 
elements of a discriminatory harassment claim. See Appellant's Brief at p. 36. This is 
incorrect. 
Contrary to Carter's self-serving assertion, the Board did not interject elements of 
a harassment claim into its analysis. As recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998), evidence of an 
employer's prompt and effective response is an affirmative defense that is available to an 
employer defending against a harassment claim. In this case, however, there is no 
indication that the Board applied any element of a harassment claim to Carter's claim for 
retaliation. Nor is there any indication that the Board applied evidence of Sullivan-
Schein's prompt response as an affirmative defense to somehow automatically defeat 
Carter's claim. Rather, the Board was clear in its decision that it did not consider 
Sullivan-Schein's prompt response as an absolute defense to Carter's claim of retaliation. 
Rather, the Board considered it only as one of several pieces of evidence that, in the 
Board's opinion, and when considered together with other evidence, negated an inference 
of a causal connection between Carter's letter and her subsequent termination. (R. 934, 
971). 
2. The Board Properly Noted That Carter's Letter Dealt With Years 
Old Events at a Different Employer. 
In applying the third element ofa prima facie case, contrary to Carter's assertions, 
the Board did not impose a requirement that the underlying complaint involve 
contemporaneous events at the current employer, nor did the Board eviscerate the first 
element of the prima facie case by its finding. See Appellant's Brief at p. 37. The Board 
simply found that because Carter's letter dealt with events that occurred several years 
earlier at another employer, such a fact was inconsistent with the proposition that her 
letter was a motivating factor for her current employer's termination of her employment 
months after the letter was written. (R. 934). This finding was permissible, and correct. 
Carter's argument that the Board's finding modifies the first element of & prima 
facie case for retaliation is incorrect and misleading. If such were true, then the third 
element of causation would be superfluous and would be subsumed by the first element. 
That is, Carter is not entitled to a finding of a causal connection simply because she 
engaged in protected activity, nor was the Board incorrect in its finding of no causal 
connection even though it found that Carter had engaged in protected activity. The 
relevant inquiry always remains whether the protected activity motivated the subsequent 
adverse action. The Board did not stray from this focus in rendering its decision. The 
Board simply applied common sense to its decision and found that evidence regarding the 
context of Carter's letter, coupled with other facts in the record, negated against a finding 
that Carter's letter was a motivating factor in her termination. (R. 971). 
3. The Board's Factual Determination Regarding Causation Was Based 
Upon Multiple Pieces of Evidence. 
Carter criticized the Board's decision by attacking individual pieces of the Board's 
findings, without acknowledging that the Board based its decision on a cumulative 
collection of evidence establishing that Sullivan-Schein disciplined and then terminated 
Carter because her co-workers complained about her predatory behavior. (R. 934). That 
is, the Board did not rule that because Sullivan-Schein took prompt and appropriate 
action in response to Carter's letter that such a fact by itself defeated Carter's retaliation 
claim. Nor did the Board decide that just because Carter's letter dealt with events 
occurring several years earlier at a different employer that such a fact by itself resulted in 
a finding of no retaliation. Rather, in deciding the issue of causation, the Board simply 
found that Sullivan-Schein's prompt response to Carter's letter, coupled with evidence 
regarding the context of her letter, considered together with other evidence of her co-
workers' repeated complaints about her predatory behavior, provided the Board a rational 
basis to conclude that Sullivan-Schein did not have a retaliatory motive in its decision to 
terminate her employment. (R. 934, 971). At a minimum, Carter failed in her proof, and 
thus this Court should affirm the Board's conclusion. 
B. The Board Based its Decision Upon the Evidence Previously Submitted 
in the Case in Accordance with Utah Code § 34A-l-303(4)(c). 
In her attempt to set aside the Board's decision, Carter unjustifiably argued that 
the Board exceeded its authority in considering "arguments" that were not previously 
raised in the case. See Appellant's Brief at pp. 32-34. Carter created this argument based 
upon a false premise that certain of the Board's findings of fact constitute '"argument." 
Carter's self-created characterization of the Board's decision is not only incorrect, but it 
conveniently provides Carter with an excuse to shirk her responsibility to marshal the 
evidence supporting the Board's findings. Carter's attempt to label "findings of fact" as 
"argument" also allows her to incorrectly imply that the Board's decision was not based 
on the evidence previously submitted. In reality, the Board's findings are clearly based 
upon the evidence presented in this case* See Appellant's Brief at p. 30 ("None of these 
arguments had previously been raised in the case, and there is no evidence in the record 
to support them."). This Court should reject these contortions of the evidence. 
1. The Board's Finding of No Causal Connection was not "Argument." 
In reaching its decision, the Board made a factual determination that there was no 
causal connection between Carter's December 14, 1997 letter and her subsequent 
discipline and termination. (R. 934). This determination is a factual determination. See 
Viktron/Lika, 38 P.3d at 995. The Board based its determination upon certain findings of 
fact which included a finding, among others, that Sullivan-Schein's "prompt and 
appropriate action to prevent any future problems" was a fact inconsistent with the 
proposition that Carter's letter was a motivating factor for Sullivan's subsequent action 
against her. (R. 934). Carter may disagree with the conclusions, but this is clearly a 
"finding of fact" made by the Board, and not an "argument." The Board emphasized in 
its decision that "Sullivan-Schein's response is but one fact out of many that sheds light 
on the ultimate question of Sullivan-Schein's motivation for its subsequent discharge of 
Ms. Carter." (R. 971). Moreover, Sullivan-Schein's prompt and appropriate response to 
Carter's letter is sufficiently set forth in the record and is adequate as one piece of 
evidence, when considered with other evidence, to support the Board's determination that 
no causal connection existed between Carter's letter and her termination months later. 
See Hearing Exhibits P-2, R-3; David's 6/10 HT @ 171-173; App. 311-312. 
2. The Board Didn't "Argue" its Factual Conclusion That the 
Investigation Into Carter's Complaint was not a Sham. 
Carter also deceptively labels as an "argument" the Board's finding that four 
specific factors were attributed to Sullivan-Schein's failure to investigate even more 
thoroughly the details of the complaints against Carter. See Appellant's Brief at pp. 32, 
34. Although the Board found it was possible to fault Sullivan-Schein for failing to 
investigate more thoroughly the allegations against Carter, it also found substantial 
evidence in the record to support its finding that any deficiency in Sullivan-Schein's 
investigation was attributable to legitimate business reasons connected with and related to 
the complexity of the merger. (R. 934-935, 970-971). That is, the Board found that 
Sullivan-Schein's failure to more thoroughly investigate the complaints against Carter 
was not attributable to her December 14, 1997 letter, but rather was attributable to the 
cumulative and chaotic circumstances surrounding the merger and to the repetitive nature 
of Carter's predatory conduct against her fellow sales representatives. (R. 934-935). The 
four factors that the Board found attributable to Sullivan-Schein's reasons for 
investigating the complaints against Carter as forcefully as she would have preferred all 
have sufficient and substantial support in the record. (R. 935). 
(a) Wide-ranging responsibilities of Sullivan-Schein's managers. 
The Board found it significant that the two individuals responsible for disciplining 
and then terminating Carter's employment, Joseph Scheutzow and James Engel, had 
expansive responsibilities related to the management of Sullivan-Schein's sales force. 
Joseph Scheutzow, Sullivan-Schein's then regional manager for the Pacific Northwest 
region and Carter's direct supervisor, maintained his office in Seattle, Washington and 
was responsible for Sullivan-Schein's sales staff in Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Utah and 
parts of western Montana. (Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 214; App. 256). James Engel, 
Sullivan-Schein's then zone manager for the western zone, was responsible for all sales 
operations within approximately 15 western states, supervised four regional managers, 
and supervised approximately 240 employees. (Engel's 3/28 HT @ 96; App. 226). 
(b) Disorganization and confusion engendered by the merger. 
Joining two previously competing sales forces together was a delicate and fragile 
business arrangement, given the competitive landscape of merging and integrating once 
two competitive sales forces into the same market with the same customer base. (Engel's 
3/28 HT @ 96-108, 114-116, 121-124, 128-129, 141-143; Scheutzow's 6/10 HT @ 127-
128; App. 226-229, 231, 233-235, 238, 300). The merger created an overlap of 
customers between sales representatives, as many sales representatives from the merged 
companies had the assignment of the same sales accounts, or what were referred to as 
"crossover accounts." (Engel's 3/28 HT @ 118-119; Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 220-223; 
App. 232, 257-258). 
(c) The Company's paramount concern for the continuity of its 
newly combined sales force. 
One of the most critical keys to the success of the merger was that the newly 
combined sales forces "play like a team." (EngePs 3/28 HT @ 114-121; Scheutzow's 
3/28 HT @ 220-221; App. 231-233, 257-258). This was a message that was made clear 
to everyone by James Stahly and James Engel at the Seattle, Washington roadshow held 
for Sullivan-Schein sales representatives to explain the details of the merger; the same 
"road show" attended by Carter. (Carter's 3/26 HT @ 178-179; EngePs 3/28 HT @ 112-
121; App. 98, 230-233). Sullivan-Schein stressed to all "road show" attendees that the 
newly merged company would have a "zero tolerance" for anyone who continued to call 
on customers that were no longer assigned to them. (Scheutzow's 3/27 HT @ 183; 
Engel's 3/28 HT @ 120-121; Scheutzow's 6/10 HT @ 126-128; App. 171, 232-233, 
300). It was further stressed to the "road show" attendees that if any sales representative 
competed with their own team members by calling on accounts no longer assigned to 
them, such conduct would subject them to termination. (Engel's 3/28 HT @ 114-116, 
119-121, 159-160, 167-168; Scheutzow's 6/10 HT @ 126-128; App. 231-233, 242, 244, 
300). The success of the merger was dependent, in part, on a smooth integration of the 
two merged sales forces and for the sales representatives to follow the critical company 
directive of not calling on accounts no longer assigned to them. (Engel's 3/28 HT @ 98-
121, 128-129, 141-142; Scheutzow's 6/10 HT @ 127-128; App. 227-233, 234-235, 238, 
300). Carter knowingly violated this game plan. 
(d) The repetitive nature of the complaints about Carter's 
conduct. 
The Board found significant that any failure of Sullivan-Schein to more 
thoroughly investigate the details of the complaints was, in part, attributable to the 
repetitive nature of the complaints made against Carter about her predatory conduct. (R. 
935). The evidence in this case showed Carter's clear and undeniable pattern making 
attempts to undermine the sales relationships and credibility of her fellow sales 
representative by engaging in intra-company competitive conduct; conduct purposefully 
engaged in to protect her sales territory. (Carter's 3/26 HT @ 169-172; App. 96). The 
substantial evidence in the record supports this finding. 
The record shows that Carter was the subject of three separate complaints from 
co-workers involving similar predatory behavior; one involving no discipline, the second 
involving a written warning, and the third resulting in her termination. (R. 932). The 
three complaints against Carter all echoed the same type of predatory behavior; behavior 
that Sullivan-Schein had previously warned all sales representatives, including Carter, to 
avoid. (Carter's 3/26 HT @ 169; Engel's 3/28 HT @ 113-122; App. 96, 231-233). 
The substantial evidence makes it clear that on the third occasion, when Butler 
reported Carter's intrusion into the Heritage Dental account, Carter had already 
established a pattern of repetitive predatory conduct by soliciting the accounts of Dr. 
Brooks, Dr. Clegg and Heritage Dental; conduct that her fellow sales representatives 
greatly resented. Consequently, Scheutzow knew, at the time that Butler complained to 
him about Carter's intrusion into the Heritage Dental account, that Carter had 
accumulated a total of three complaints against her regarding conduct that her fellow 
sales representatives considered unfair. ("She's doing it again." Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 
233-234; Scheutzow's 6/10 HT @ 130-131; App. 261, 301). Termination was easily 
anticipated from, and clearly resulted from this. 
3. The Board's Findings Are Based upon Sullivan-Schein's Good-Faith 
Belief that Carter Violated Established Rules of Conduct. 
The Board was crystal clear in stating its conclusion that management honestly 
believed that Carter had violated established rules of conduct when it took action against 
her. (R. 934). This finding is supported by the evidence that Sullivan-Schein did not 
take any disciplinary action against Carter until after two co-workers, Bingham and 
Butler, complained about Carter's predatory conduct. There is no evidence that either 
Bingham or Butler lied or exaggerated about Carter's unfair conduct, nor is there any 
evidence that either Engel or Scheutzow disbelieved the complaints of either Bingham or 
Butler. Consequently, the Board found that the disciplinary actions taken against Carter 
were all prompted by co-workers' similar complaints involving the same type of 
predatory behavior; co-workers who knew nothing about Carter's December 14, 1997 
letter. (R. 934, 971). The record is clear that Sullivan-Schein's decision to discipline, 
and then to subsequently terminate Carter's employment was based directly upon 
Carter's own co-workers' complaints about her predatory conduct. (Carter's 3/26 HT @ 
189; Butler's 3/26 HT @ 241-242, 257, 273-276; Bingham's 3/27 HT @ 270-275, 280, 
282; Engel's 3/28 HT @ 136-143; Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 232-240; App. 101, 114, 118, 
122, 191-194, 236-238, 260-262). Based upon this evidence, it was rational for the 
Board to find that there was no causal connection between Carter's December 14, 1997 
letter and her March 25, 2998 termination. Thus, this Court should affirm. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reject Carter's invitation to reweigh 
the evidence in this case so that a decision can be made in her favor. Utah's statutes and 
the jurisprudence of this Court preclude such an exercise by this Court, because it is well-
established that even where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same 
evidence, it is for the Board to draw those inferences rather than the appellate court. See 
Grace Drilling Co., 776 at 68. Carter has neither marshaled the evidence in this case nor 
demonstrated a fatal flaw in the evidence that would require this Court to reverse. 
Accordingly, because the Board's decision is supported by substantial evidence, this 
Court should affirm the Board's decision. 
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